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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Two studies examined how interpersonal rivalries affect individuals’ consumption 
propensities. The current research suggests that comparing poorly to a rival is an 
aversive state that people seek to compensate for by signaling that they are at par with 
(or better than) their rivals. One means by which people may compete with their rivals 
is to engage in conspicuous consumption, that is, the acquisition of goods that signal 
status or reputation. In Study 1, participants who recalled a rival were significantly 
more likely to buy a conspicuous good that was not owned by the rival than were 
participants who recalled a cooperative peer. In Study 2, we found that participants 
who recalled a rival were significantly more willing to pay for a product than were 
control participants, but only if the product was associated with status.  Furthermore, 
anticipated happiness upon acquiring the product drove rivals’ willingness to spend on 
status objects, suggesting that consumption may serve to repair the aversive state of 
faring poorly to a rival. 
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The Effects of Rivalry on Conspicuous Consumption 
 
“Too many people spend money they haven’t earned, to buy things they don’t want, to 
impress people they don’t like” – Will Smith 
Competition is ubiquitous. Employees vie for promotions, athletes compete for 
a spot on the team, and companies fight for market share. Competitive behavior, or the 
pursuit of assets perceived to be scarce and contested (cf., Deutsch, 1949), is often 
associated with the desire to “win” or defeat one’s opponents. However, some 
opponents loom larger than do others. These enduring opponents, or rivals, can induce 
a motivation to perform that goes beyond the objective stakes of the competition. 
Examples of such rivalries are prominent in a broad range of settings. From rivalries in 
sports, such as the historic Yankees-Red Sox rivalry in Major League Baseball, to 
longstanding competitions between firms, such as the rivalry between Microsoft and 
Apple, rivals often come to view each other as more than simple competitors. 
Although some scholars have suggested that competition can increase people’s 
motivation and promote their survival and success (e.g., Axelrod, 1984), in the present 
research, we advance a potential pernicious consequence of rivalry. The above 
quotation captures the view that individuals acquire material goods not for their 
inherent value or qualities, but as a display of wealth or status to others. Indeed, the 
North American idiom “keeping up with the Joneses” reflects the notion of using 
one’s neighbor as a benchmark for one’s social status. Arguably, the American 
population’s insatiable appetite for consumption has contributed to the staggering $14 
trillion in consumer debt and the fact that over 40% of American households spend 
more than they earn (Golub, 2008). Economists have explained this conspicuous 
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consumption (i.e., the act of acquiring goods not for their inherent objective or 
subjective value, but to signal social status (Veblen, 1889/1994) with the economics of 
wealth signaling (Bagwell & Bernheim, 1996; Charles, Hurst, & Roussanov, 2009), 
bandwagon effects (i.e., people want the objects that they believe other people want; 
Van Herpen, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2009), and keeping-up-with-the-Joneses (i.e., 
people want what their peers have; Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Frank, 1999). Such terms 
reflect that individuals’ choices depend on what other individuals have or want, but 
not the conditions upon which this tendency is contingent. In the current research, we 
suggest that rival relationships in particular engender a tendency to engage in 
conspicuous consumption. We view rivalry as an inherently relational phenomenon, in 
which actors perceive a competition for resources, goods, status, or positions (Levine 
& Thompson, 1996; Menon et al., 2006) with one another in a zero-sum or “win-lose” 
fashion. We suggest that a rival’s acquisition of a favorable possession leads to an 
aversive state that individuals will attempt to attenuate or alter. Given that goods can 
be used to convey status (e.g., Belk, Bahn, & Mayer, 1982), we predict that 
individuals experiencing rivalry, relative to control peers (or baseline conditions), will 
exhibit an increased desire to acquire products associated with status as measured by 
their willingness to pay. This acquisition of high status product may serve to repair the 
perceived status imbalance introduced by the rival’s favorable acquisition. 
Rivalry: Competition as a Relational Phenomenon 
As stated in the introduction, rivalries are prominent in a broad range of 
settings and can induce a motivation to perform that goes beyond the objective stakes 
of the competition. In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that these rivalries can become 
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sufficiently intense to lead to non-rational competitive behaviors. For example, Boston 
Scientific recently overpaid to acquire Guidant, a move which has since been called 
“arguably the second-worst” acquisition ever, largely because it was bidding against 
rival Johnson & Johnson (Malhotra, Ku, & Murnighan, 2008). Likewise, experimental 
evidence suggests that the desire to beat rival bidders in an auction can lead 
participants to pay more for an item than it is worth to them (Ku, Malhotra, & 
Murnigan, 2005). Ku et al.’s findings stand in contrast with rational choice 
assumptions that bidders will stop bidding when they hit their limit (i.e., the price at 
which they value the item) (see Vickrey, 1961 for review). The desire to “win” a 
dispute can also lead people to pursue costly litigation even when less antagonistic 
strategies would produce superior outcomes (Malhotra et al., 2008). These examples 
suggest that rivalry can be a significant psychological phenomenon with powerful 
behavioral consequences. 
We define rivalry as a subjective competitive relationship that increases the 
psychological involvement of participants beyond what the objective characteristics of 
the situation warrant (Kilduff et al., in press). Moreover, we view rivalry as an 
inherently relational phenomenon, in which actors perceive a competition for 
resources, goods, status, or positions (Levine & Thompson, 1996; Menon et al., 2006) 
with one another in a zero-sum or “win-lose” fashion. This definition warrants several 
points of discussion. 
First, the increased psychological involvement we refer to in the definition 
reflects our view that individuals place a greater value on competition against a rival 
than on other opponents, and place greater significance on the competition than the 
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objective stakes (e.g., financial, reputational) warrant. This psychological involvement 
suggests that, in contrast to past characterizations of competition (e.g., Bothner, Kang, 
& Stuart, 2007; Deutsch, 1949), rivalry, as we portray it, exists within individuals’ 
minds. Second, the ‘relationship’ component of our definition suggests that prior 
interaction is a prerequisite to rivalry. That is, the past competition between 
competitors can leave a lasting “psychological residue”, which may foment the 
development of a rivalry (Kilduff et al., p. 946). Third, people equate a rival’s gains 
with their own losses. Thus, rivalries may make it difficult for actors (individuals or 
groups) to capture the joint gains from collaboration or cooperation. Fourth, the 
subjective nature of rivalry means that we do not view reciprocity as a necessary 
component of rivalry—that is, rivalry may not be a two-way street. For instance, by 
presenting themselves as a rival to a high status or highly competent rivals, people 
may gain status by association or feel a motivational boost by seeking victory against 
the high status others (Kilduff et al., 2010).  Finally, rivalries may vary in strength 
(much like other relational constructs; see Marsden & Campbell, 1984) and may exist 
in a wide range of domains. Regarding the latter, evidence for rivalry has been found 
between individuals vying for the same romantic partner (Maner, Miller, Rouby, & 
Gaillot, 2010), success in an athletic contest (Kilduff et al., 2010), or social status in a 
group (Kilduff & Anderson, 2009). Moreover, it may be possible for rivalries to exist 
in multiple domains–an idea that we will address in the current article. 
Prior Research 
A reasonable starting point for the discussion of rivalry is the broader literature 
on competition. We note that, although the literature on competition is vast, the role of 
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relationships—and by extension, rivalries—is under-emphasized. Early work on 
competition focused on the parameters of competitive (vs. cooperative) situations 
(Deutsch, 1949; Maller, 1929; May & Doob, 1937; Mead, 1937). For instance, 
Deutsch (1949) defined competition as a situation in which goal attainment of 
participants is negatively related, such that victory of one participant comes at the loss 
of the other. Following Deutsch’s conceptualization, much research on competition 
has pitted participants against one another or against confederates in one-off 
competitions (e.g., Deci, Betley, Kahle, Abrams, & Porac, 1981; Reeve & Deci, 1996; 
Stanne, Johnson, & Johnson, 1999; Tauer & Harackiewicz, 1999). For example, in 
Deci et al.’s (1981) article, participants solved puzzles in the presence of a same-sex 
confederate who posed as another participant completing the same task. The authors 
found that intrinsic motivation for the task decreased when participants were told to 
compete with the confederate compared with when they were just told to complete the 
task as quickly as possible. More recently, scholars have taken a person-focused 
approach, focusing on the effects of individual differences on competitive behaviors. 
For example, De Dreu and Boles (1998) found that negotiators with a prosocial value 
orientation (i.e., people who attach importance to achieving high outcomes for both 
the self and for others to whom they are interdependent) were more likely to operate 
under cooperative heuristics (e.g., “equal split is fair”).  In contrast, negotiators with 
an individualistic value orientation (i.e., people who attach importance to achieving 
high outcomes for the self) were more likely to rely on competitive heuristics (e.g., 
“your gain is my loss”). 
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Although we do not deny the importance of the situation or the individual in 
influencing competitive behaviors, the nature of competition will likely vary 
depending on the prior relationship between competitors. Despite little extant research 
on the relational ties between competitors, some literatures speak to their importance. 
For example, in the negotiations literature, researchers have demonstrated that 
interpersonal factors, such as the presence of face-to-face contact (Drolet & Morris, 
2000), partners’ positive and negative affect in past negotiations (Thomas, Valley, & 
Kramer, 1995), and relationship closeness (Valley, Neal, & Mannix, 1995), can 
significantly influence the process and outcomes of negotiations. As mentioned above, 
people are also more likely to exceed their bidding limits when facing one or few, 
rather than many, competing bidders (Ku et al., 2005; Malhotra, 2009). The authors 
suggested that these head-to-head bidding competitions might produce rivalries, which 
may push bidders to care more about defeating opponents, or relative gains, than the 
personal gain of obtaining the object at a reasonable price. Together, these findings 
underscore the importance of considering the relational context when examining 
competitive behavior. 
In a recent exception to the scant treatment of rivalry in the literature, Menon 
et al. (2006) explored how people react to good ideas authored by existing internal 
rivals (i.e., those at the same organization) versus external rivals (i.e., those at another 
organization). Participants in three studies wrote about a real instance in which they 
coped with a rival who was either internal or external to the organization and then 
responded to a simulation in which the person developed an innovative idea. An 
advantage of Menon et al.’s method is that it evoked a real rival in order to stimulate 
 
 
 
6 
strong, realistic emotions and responses. The authors found that, because internal 
 
rivals pose a more direct threat to one’s personal status, people were less willing to use 
the good ideas of internal rivals than of external rivals. That is, because organizations 
are often replete with internal competition for rewards and status, valuing the idea of 
internal rivals may signal deference and transfer power to the rival by acknowledging 
their relatively greater ability to cope with critical problems (cf. Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1982). In contrast, out-group rivals’ ideas may be seen as more valuable and scarce, 
thus adding value to the in-group (Menon & Pfeffer, 2002). In addition, because rivals 
tend to be similar and matched in skill (Kilduff et al., 2010), they represent an 
accessible source of social comparison. Thus, in Menon et al.’s study, a rival’s good 
ideas represented an upward social comparison that highlighted the self’s personal 
inadequacies. 
Consistent with our conceptualization of rivalry, Kilduff et al. (2010) examined 
how the relationships between competitors influenced the subjective intensity of the 
rivalry between them. Specifically, in the context of North Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) Men’s Basketball teams, the authors tested how proximity, 
similarity between teams, and histories of prior interactions predicted rivalries. Rivalry 
was assessed by asking college sportswriters, coaches, and players to indicate the 
extent to which they saw the other teams in the conference as rivals to 
their basketball team. The results revealed that geographic proximity, similar status, 
and repeated competitions predicted the strength of rivalries. The authors suggest that 
closely located, evenly matched competitors are likely to be more salient, and thus, 
more likely seen as rivals. Regarding the history of competition, the authors suggest 
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that the experience of competition can leave a competitive residue that endures even 
after contests have been decided. Thus, repeated competition is likely to engender 
rivalry, as the competitive residue from past contests accumulates. In examining the 
consequences of rivalries, Kilduff et al. found that rivalry increased success on effort- 
based tasks—operationalized as defense in basketball. Taken together, the results of 
Kilduff et al.’s study underscore the importance of examining the relationships 
between competitors and the consequences of these relationships. 
We believe that one potential consequence of rivalry is a “carryover effect” 
 
such that rivals come to be threatened by each other’s favorable possessions, skills, 
 
and attributions in unrelated domains. Because rivals tend to be similar and matched in 
skill (Kilduff et al., 2010), they represent an accessible source of social comparison. 
Thus, in Menon et al.’s study, a rival’s good idea—an idea that the self did not have— 
represented an upward social comparison that highlighted the self’s personal 
inadequacies. Despite Menon et al.’s focus on upward comparisons, we note that the 
ongoing nature of a rivalry likely means that there is variance in the relative outcomes 
for rivals. That is, at one time, a rival may represent an upward social comparison, but 
at another time, be in a less favorable position, and represent a downward social 
comparison. However, much like Menon et al., the current paper will explore the 
psychological consequences of a rival’s possession of a valuable item that the self 
does not have. In this vein, when a rival comes to acquire a desirable attribute or 
possession outside of the original domain of rivalry, we predict that individuals will 
experience envy (i.e., the unpleasant emotion that can arise when we compare 
unfavorably with others), and consequently desire to obtain a conspicuous good for 
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themselves. This prediction stems, in part, from people’s prevailing desires to 
 
maintain positive beliefs about the self (see Dunning, 2007), which may be threatened 
by a rival’s superior position—a point to which we turn to next. The self-threat 
produced by rivals may provoke defensive patterns of responding (e.g., Brockman & 
Janoff-Bulman, 1977; Morse & Gergen, 1970); thus, people’s self-maintenance needs 
may infiltrate their judgments about the ideas and belongings of a rival individual. 
Rivals as Threats to the Self 
A robust body of social psychological research suggests that people are 
motivated to maintain sacrosanct beliefs about the self as a competent, lovable, and 
moral individual (see Dunning, 2007 for a review). Moreover, as Leary (2004) 
cogently described in a work entitled The Curse of the Self, after constructing these 
favorable self-concepts, we work hard to defend them against imperfection. As Leary 
puts it, as the “self-aware animal”, people have the remarkable ability to evaluate their 
own thoughts, behaviors, and to imagine others’ points of view, including what the 
others think of them. However, these skills may come at a cost as well, leading people 
to worry about improbable or trivial events, making mountains out of “entirely 
imaginary molehills” (p. 21). Perhaps worse, the desire to impress the self and others 
has been found to lead people to non-rational and even risky behaviors, such as binge 
drinking in the face of peer influence (see Leary, 2004 for a review). Of high import 
for the consequences of rivalry, contemporary social psychology has pointed to the 
importance of the social context, and subsequent social comparisons, in influencing 
self-judgments (e.g., Wood, 1989). 
Social Comparison and Competition 
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Indeed, an important source of knowledge about oneself is comparisons with 
other people. Festinger based his (1954) theory of social comparison on this insight. 
According to Festinger, although people would be best served to attend to direct, 
objective standards when making self-evaluations, these standards are often 
unavailable. In these situations, people often compare themselves with other people. 
When making these social comparisons, much research has demonstrated that 
exposure to persons who are more fortunate than an individual can diminish the 
individual’s feelings of self-worth, whereas exposure to less fortunate targets can 
enhance the individual’s self-concept (e.g., Friend & Gilbert, 1973; Latane, 1966; 
Stapel & Suls, 2004). For instance, in Morse and Gergen’s (1970) seminal work, 
applicants for a summer job saw another applicant who was both well dressed and 
competent or one who was disheveled and disorganized. Applicants exposed to the 
“clean” competitor experienced lower self-esteem, whereas applicants exposed to the 
“dirty” competitor experienced increased self-esteem. These results suggest how 
social comparisons can threaten self-worth. 
In addition to self-threat, social comparison scholars have demonstrated a 
strong link between social comparison and competitive behavior. For instance, an 
upward comparison of the self to someone who is better off on a valued dimension can 
be painful and often leads to increased competitiveness (Goethals, 1986; Goethals & 
Darley, 1977; Hoffman, Festinger, & Lawrence, 1954). As Festinger (1954, p. 126) 
suggested, “competitive behavior, action to protect one’s superiority, and even some 
kinds of behavior that might be called cooperative, are manifestations in the social 
process of these pressures” to reduce such discrepancies. Consistent with this, 
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Hoffman et al.’s (1954) seminal work found that, after one participant in a group of 
three began scoring especially well on a performance task, the other two participants 
began to behave in ways aimed at preventing the outperforming other from gaining 
additional points. Such competitive behavior served to reduce the performance 
discrepancies between higher and lower scorers. 
The power of social comparison is also evident in research on the positional 
bias and relative deprivation. The positional bias is defined as the tendency for people 
to judge their satisfaction with goods in some domains according to how much one has 
of the resource compared to others rather than the absolute amount one has (Hill & 
Buss, 2004). Hill and Buss (2004) introduce the positional bias from an evolutionary 
perspective, suggesting that the drive to outperform rivals in fitness-relevant resource 
competitions represents an important domain of adaptive problems. They suggest that 
individuals who judged their success based on their position relative to potential 
competitors would have continued to strive to improve their position, leaving “more 
complacent competitors…in the evolutionary dust” (p. 132). A large body of work 
supports the authors’ proposition. Individuals’ subjective well-being seems to be 
influenced more by relative, rather than absolute levels, in domains such as income, 
physical attractiveness, years of education, and intelligence (Clark & Oswald, 1996; 
Frank, 1999; Solnick & Hemenway, 1998). 
We suspect that rival individuals represent an accessible, and threatening, 
source of social comparison because of research suggesting the commensurability of 
rivals to the self (Kilduff et al., 2010), and the self-relevance of the domains in which 
rivalries usually exist (DeSteno & Salovey, 1996; Tesser & Smith, 1980). First, 
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according to Tesser’s (1988) Self-Evaluation Maintenance (SEM) Model, for 
competition to occur, the social comparison must be important to the self.   Tesser’s 
SEM model posits that feelings of self-worth are enhanced or diminished by others’ 
performance according to (a) the individual’s relationship to the other and (b) the 
personal relevance of the dimension under consideration. SEM model highlights two 
important points of consideration. First, not all upward comparisons are painful. Self- 
threat occurs only if the dimension is relevant to the self. Second, superior 
performance on a self-relevant domain is more threatening if it comes from a close 
rather than distant other. For example, Tesser and Smith (1980) tested acquainted or 
unacquainted pairs of participants in a task that was framed as either relevant or 
irrelevant to a valued dimension – verbal skill. Results indicated that, when asked to 
judge the performance of another participant, individuals were the least generous 
when assessing an acquainted other on a self-relevant task. 
Similar to Tesser’s proposition, the related attributes hypothesis (Goethals & 
Darley, 1977; see Suls & Wheeler, 2000) suggests that the commensurability of the 
reference person is another factor influencing whether social comparison is important 
to the self. That is, people tend to choose a reference person who is similar to the self 
in performance or opinion, given his or her standing on characteristics related to and 
predictive of performance or opinion (Goethals & Darley, 1977). The reference person 
is similar to the self, and helps to motivate the self to perform comparably, if not 
better, than the commensurate other. This argument is also similar to earlier 
predictions made by Festinger (1954) in his social comparison theory. A central 
proposition of Festinger’s theory is the “similarity hypothesis,” which posits that 
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individuals prefer to compare themselves to similar others. This is a reasonable 
approach, given that attempts to evaluate one’s ability based on the performance of a 
very different individual will only lead to the conclusion that one’s performance is 
unique, but will not be indicative of whether a performance level is at an appropriate 
level. To borrow an example from Zanna, Goethals, and Hill (1975) a swimmer 
evaluating his or her swimming speed would consider not only other swimmers’ speed 
(the dimension under evaluation), but also the other swimmers’ prior experience, 
recent practice, age, and gender (dimensions related to swimming speed) when 
selecting someone for comparison. Novice swimmers garner more information about 
their performance by comparing themselves to other novices than by comparing 
themselves to Olympic level swimmers. 
Given research suggesting that rivals both challenge each other on self-relevant 
domains (Tesser & Smith, 1980) and tend to be similar to each other (Kilduff et al., 
2010), rivals thus represent an accessible source of social comparison. We do not 
claim that rivals are necessarily similar to each other in a holistic manner (e.g., same 
gender, race, socioeconomic status). Nor do we rule out the possibility of asymmetric 
rivalries. However, we do suspect that rivalries will tend to exist within a reasonable 
range of ability level and within a domain of high specificity (e.g., two novice 
swimmers rather than a novice and an advanced swimmer and academics in the same 
rather than a different field, respectively). Indeed, Kilduff et al.’s (2010) findings lend 
some empirical support to these suggestions. Moreover, even the most distinctive of 
rivals are similar by virtue of having the same interest in one domain (e.g., our two 
novice swimmers both partake in swimming). 
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Therefore, returning to Menon et al.’s findings, the internal rivals’ good idea 
likely represented an upward social comparison that highlighted individuals’ personal 
inadequacies more so than did the idea of external rivals. That is, because of the 
comparability of two internal rivals, and direct competition for status and rewards 
within the in-group (Menon & Pfeffer, 2003), the possession of a valued idea by an 
internal rival highlighted something that the self did not have. Consistent with this 
suggestion, Menon et al. also found that participants’ perceived threat to status 
mediated the effect of an internal rival on avoiding the rival’s good ideas. Likewise, in 
study 3, some participants were given an opportunity to “bounce back” from the threat 
of a rival by receiving a self-affirmation manipulation.  During a self-affirmation 
manipulation, participants identify their cherished values (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983). 
Ostensibly, self-affirmation allows people to focus on other valued, positive attributes 
of the self (Steele, 1988), thereby alleviating the anxiety of being outperformed in one 
domain. Indeed, self-affirmation has been shown to reduce defensive behaviors such 
as stereotyping (Fein & Spencer, 1987), rationalization (Steele & Liu, 1983), and 
stereotype threat (Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006). Menon et al. found 
that self-affirmed participants were significantly more likely to increase pursuit of 
knowledge from internal rivals than were non-affirmed participants. These findings 
suggest that the rivals posed a threat to the participants’ self-views, which was 
overcome by allowing participants to rebound from the self-threat. 
Although Menon et al.’s study examined another’s possession of a favorable 
idea, we suspect that because of the competitive nature of rivalries, as well as the 
nature of rivals as salient social comparisons, that people will also use rivals to 
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evaluate their relative standing with regard to the possession of favorable item.  We 
suspect that a rival’s possession of a desirable skill, object, or attribution—although 
unrelated to the original domain of competition—will similarly threaten the self by 
highlighting that the possession is something the self does not have. This self-threat 
may lead to the experience of envy—a negative emotion closely associated with 
upward social comparisons (Salovey, 1991). In order to reduce this negative affect, 
people may seek to demonstrate that they are on par with (or better than) their rivals. 
Acquiring status is one means of achieving this goal. We now turn to research on 
envy, which suggests that being outperformed leads to a negative affective state, 
which drives individuals to reduce this state by decreasing the imbalance between the 
self and the envied other. 
Envy 
 
The social comparison process is replete with intense affective responses (e.g., 
DeSteno & Salovey, 1996; Wert & Salovey, 2004). One emotion that scholars have 
closely linked to upward comparisons is envy (Salovey, 1991; Silver & Sabini, 1978), 
defined as an unpleasant, often painful emotion characterized by feelings of 
resentment, hostility, and inferiority produced by the awareness of others enjoying a 
desired possession (e.g., Parrott, 1991; Parrott & Smith, 1993). Of relevance for our 
purposes, envy seems particularly likely to arise in situations in which a rival 
individual stands to best the self. Unlike the related experience resentment, envy 
requires not only the recognition of the other’s advantage but also the simultaneous 
recognition of one’s own disadvantage (Smith, 1991). Given individuals perceptions 
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of rivalries as a zero-sum game, we suspect that any advantage a rival has will connote 
a disadvantage for the self and lead to envy. 
Recently, some scholars have suggested that envy is best represented as 
comprising two distinct emotions (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; Smith & Kim, 
2007)—one called benign envy and another called malicious envy; the difference 
being that benign envy fosters admiration and emulation whereas malicious envy 
fosters hostility and resentment (Smith & Kim, 2007; van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & 
Pieters, 2010). Research has focused largely on malicious envy—finding for example 
that it is related to dishonesty and unethical behavior (e.g., Gino & Pierce, 2009; 
Moran & Schweitzer, 2008). However, recent research has investigated the effects of 
benign envy on motivation and self-improvement. For example, van de Ven, 
Zeelenberg, and Pieters (2009) found that benign envy is similar to comparing oneself 
upward (cf. Mussweiler, 2003), such that people become inspired by others and aim to 
behave like others. In van de Ven et al.’s words (2009), people “level up” and 
assimilate those whom they are benignly envious. At the same time, people “level 
down” those whom they are maliciously envious, by degrading them. As a result, 
benign envy may motivate people to emulate others’ behavior, which is seen as both 
desirable and greater than their own. In addition, malicious envy may motivate people 
to derogate and become cynical of others’ behavior or possessions (Smith et al., 1999). 
 
Important to our purposes, people are more likely to envy those who are 
similar to them (e.g., Parrott, 1991; Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Schaubroeck & Lam, 
2004). This prediction is consistent with Elster’s (1998) conjecture that similarity will 
 
increase envy because similarity enhances individuals’ ability to imagine a situation in 
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which they ended up with the desired possession. As Elster puts it, the envying person 
believes “it could have been me”. Elster’s point parallels research on the simulation 
heuristic (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), which finds that emotional response are 
more intense if people can more easily imagine alternatives to an emotion-evoking 
situation than if they cannot. Given that rivals tend to be similar and evenly-matched 
(Kilduff et al., in press), it seems likely that a rival’s favorable outcome will elicit this 
sort of counterfactual thinking (e.g., “it could be me”) that leads to envy. 
Another important facet of envy is the desire it evokes. For instance, Parrot and 
Smith (1993) found that participants reported the “longing for what another has” to be 
the most characteristic of their experience. According to Parrot (2001), the importance 
of this envious desire is twofold: First, that desire is a precondition for experiencing 
envy—people must want to possess the item for themselves. Second, being envious 
may increased the desire and striving for the object or quality. The latter notion 
dovetails with Douglas and Isherwood’s (1979) “envy theory of needs”, which posits 
that consumers’ preferences can often be better explained by envy than by the intrinsic 
value of goods. Indeed, marketers often aim at capitalize on this envious desire by 
trying to evoke envy in consumers (Belk, 2008). 
Interestingly, regarding envious desire, some scholars (e.g., Heider, 1958; 
Young, 1987), have suggested that people can become envious of another person’s 
attainment just because the other has it. Thus, just as a child may not become 
interested in a toy until the toy is possessed by his or her sibling, people may 
experience envy at another’s possession of an item or attribute they would not have 
otherwise desired (see Silver & Sabini, 1978 for a full discussion). Given the salience 
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of rivals as a source of social comparison, it is plausible that envy arises following a 
rival’s favorable acquisition. That being said, the current study will also provide an 
initial exploration of the relationship between rivalry and envy, and how this 
relationship may contribute to conspicuous consumption. We will explore whether one 
or both of malicious and benign envy operate following a rivalry acquisition of a 
favorable item. 
Products and Consumption Symbolism 
 
To recap, we predict that individuals will experience envy following a rival’s 
possession of an item the self does not have. Envy induces a motivation to put oneself 
at least “to par” with the other (van de Ven et al., 2009). Given that rivalry entails 
competition for status, individuals may view a rival’s superior standing as a loss to the 
self’s social standing, which increases the motivation to restore their standing. The 
question, then, is how can rivals demonstrate their social status? Increasingly, research 
has found that products communicate information about the identities of their owners 
(e.g., Belk, Bahn, & Mayer, 1982; Shavitt, 1990). In particular, Belk and colleagues 
(1982) explored the suggestion that products can signal an individual’s status. The 
authors found that, as consumers age, they tend to gravitate toward desiring high status 
items in an effort to demonstrate their status to others. Indeed, the term conspicuous 
consumption (Veblen, 1899/1994) arose to describe the behavior of individuals who 
purchase products, not because of their inherent functional value, but as a means of 
displaying their wealth and status. Demonstrating the existence of such conspicuous 
consumption, Americans spend almost $2 billion each year to purchase and fuel their 
Hummers—a highly conspicuous and wasteful sports utility vehicle that consumes a 
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gallon of fuel every 8-11 miles. Americans spend many more billions each year on 
extravagant mansions, dinners, yachts, jewelry, and other conspicuous purchases (see 
Frank, 1999). 
Economists typically invoke the economics of wealth signaling to explain this 
pattern of consumption (e.g., Bagwell & Bernheim, 1996; Charles et al., 2009). That 
is, conspicuous consumption involves spending money to suggest to others that one 
has enough money to purchase frivolous and wasteful goods. Indeed, it is well 
established that individuals place great emphasis on their social status and strive to 
attain higher levels of status (e.g., Barkow, 1989; Frank, 1985; Veblen, 1899). 
Individuals also have routes by which they can increase status—individuals can gain 
status through the accumulation of wealth, education, and social ties with high status 
individuals (e.g., Corneo & Jeanne, 1997; Lin, Ensel, & Vaughn, 1981). However, 
these status markers can be difficult to obtain for many individuals (e.g., Lin & 
Dumin, 1996). Moreover, many of these status markers (e.g., income; education level) 
are not visible to others. Despite these barriers, individuals can demonstrate ostensible 
status through alternatives forms, such as consumption of goods that confer status. 
Thus, economists have suggested that conspicuous consumption is a costly signal of 
wealth (e.g., Corneo & Jeanne, 1997). Because income is not easily observed by 
others, people may engage in conspicuous consumption to speciously signal wealth 
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2007) and manipulate others’ perceptions of their status. 
Researchers have also recently begun to explore the possibility that 
 
individuals’ psychological motives play a vital role in explaining conspicuous 
 
consumption. Specifically, possessing status confers various psychological rewards to 
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the individual, such as enhanced self-esteem (e.g., Berger et al., 1972) and a sense of 
power (Rucker & Galinsky, 2008). The self-enhancing benefits of status combined 
with the ability of possessions to confer information about the self (e.g., Belk et al., 
1982) may result in conspicuous consumption for its self-affirmational value. 
Consistent with this proposition, Sivanathan and Pettit (2010) found that participants 
experiencing wounded egos following self-threatening feedback (Studies 1 and 2), 
actual low income (Study 3), and the anticipation of future threats (Study 4) were 
significantly more willing to spend on conspicuous goods than were participants who 
did not experience self threat. When participants were afforded an alternative route to 
repair their self-integrity (i.e., self-affirmation; Steele, 1998), they no longer sought 
out conspicuous goods following self-threat. Therefore, the results suggest that status 
goods can buffer the self against threats. 
Similarly, Rucker and Galinsky (2008) proposed that people desire to acquire 
status goods in a compensatory manner. The authors found that powerlessness 
increased individuals’ willingness to pay for items related to status. Interestingly, low 
power individuals’ willingness to pay more for a high status product was mediated by 
the perception that the product would provide them with an increased sense of power. 
Taken together, these results suggest that people may acquire status goods in a 
compensatory manner. Given that rivalry entails competition for resources and status, 
and that a rival’s gain may be viewed as threatening to the self (cf., Menon et al., 
2006), rivals may seek to acquire status goods in a compensatory manner. 
 
Another reason for rival individuals to engage in conspicuous consumption 
 
may be mood repair. According to existing theories of mood repair (e.g., Clark & Isen, 
 
 
 
20 
1982), individuals in a negative emotional state are predisposed to engage in mood 
improving behaviors, such as helping others or potentially obtaining new 
commodities. Thus, to the extent that rivalry is associated with envy, one might view 
conspicuous consumption as a mood-regulating effort. Consistent with this possibility, 
recent research has linked mood to spending. An example of this association is the 
“misery-is-not-miserly” effect. The misery-is-not-miserly effect is the tendency for 
sadness to carry over from past situations to influence unrelated economic decisions. 
For instance, Lerner et al. (2004) found that participants who received a sadness 
induction gave up 30% more money to acquire a commodity compared to other 
participants. Cryder, Lerner, Gross, and Dahl (2008) further examined this relationship 
and found the experience of feeling both sad and self-focused leads individuals to pay 
more for products. The authors suggested that sadness, coupled with self-focus, 
increases self-devaluation. This diminished sense of self then leads to a desire to 
enhance the self, which elicits increased valuations of the possessions might acquire. 
Whereas Cryder et al.’s sad participants desired any good that they did not 
already possess, we suspect that people engaged in rivalry will be more likely to value 
status items in particular. From a mood repair perspective, the negative affect 
associated with faring poorly compared to a rival may induce a motivation to engage 
in behaviors that will remove the source of that affect. Because status is relative (e.g., 
Anderson et al., 2009), and a rival’s favorable standing may be perceived as 
detrimental to the individual’s status, behaviors aimed at repairing the status 
imbalance may be used to remove the aversive feelings associated with lower status. 
Given that conspicuous consumption can impart visible status to the buyer, status 
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goods may appear more desirable to rivals, for whom the status goal is more salient. 
According to such a perspective, rival individuals, compared to the other peers, should 
anticipate greater happiness from acquiring conspicuous goods. This is a prediction we 
will examine in the current study. 
Rivalry Leads to Socially Differentiated Consumption 
 
It is important to note that we anticipate rivalry will increase the desire to acquire 
high status goods that have not been recently acquired by the rival. This prediction 
stems from (1) the ambivalence of rivals and (2) research on social differentiation. 
First, we suspect that being associated with a rival will “taint” the possession. When 
people feel threatened by a source of social comparison they feel paranoid (Kramer, 
1998) and fear that they may inadvertently affirm the reputation, competence, and 
legitimacy of the threatening other while creating doubt on their own distinctiveness 
and competence (Blau, 1995; Lee, 1997). As a result, they avoid acknowledging the 
other’s success by using a variety of strategies. For one, they may downgrade the 
importance of the object of success and thus avoid social comparisons (Brickman & 
Janoff-Bulman, 1977; Morse & Gergen, 1970). Research suggests that people change 
their performance standards depending on whether self-threat is present. For example, 
people who score well on the Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT) before coming to 
college do not consider others to be intelligent unless they, too, score well on the SAT. 
Conversely, students who score low on the SAT do not view the test as an important 
criterion for assessing intelligence (Beauregard & Dunning, 1998). Thus, if a rival, but 
not the self, possesses a valuable attainment, individuals may conclude that the item or 
skill must not be an important determinant of self-worth. Further, individuals may 
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attempt to gain status by subtly condescending or criticizing the rival’s ideas or 
possessions (Fournier, Moskowitz, & Zuroff, 2002; Gilbert, 1992). By derogating the 
item, then, individuals may protect the self against potential failure to obtain the 
possession. 
To illustrate this phenomenon, consider someone who witnesses his or her rival 
showing off a new Porsche 911 sports car. One response might be, “Yes, your car 
looks fast and fun, but it is not what is important for a car. A car should be practical 
and family friendly.” However, the negative affect experienced from comparing 
unfavorably likely still exists, and the envying individual may have an increased desire 
for a similarly conspicuous, but at the same time clearly different product. For 
instance, the envying individual in the above scenario may purchase a Mercedes-Benz 
sedan. This example illustrates social differentiation, which occurs when people are 
outperformed in one domain, and then select an alternate domain in which they might 
outperform the previously superior person. For example, Lalonde (1992) found that 
hockey teams performing poorly in their league acknowledged that the other teams 
were outperforming them, but also considered these other teams to play “dirty”. Thus, 
comparing themselves on the domain of sportsmanship allowed them to feel better 
than the others, even though the other teams were more highly ranked. How would 
social differentiation following rivalry have an impact on consumer behavior? Buying 
such a product would resolve the negative affect of being inferior, but would also 
differentiate oneself from the rival. Thus, the motivation to degrade the rival may lead 
the individual to avoid assimilation to a rival, but may simultaneously increase 
alternative actions aimed at restoring any imbalance (cf., van de Ven, 2011). 
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In sum, the prior literature review elucidated several key propositions. First, 
rivals represent a salient source of social comparison that is important to the self. 
Second, when a rival comes to acquire a favorable product,  people experience  an 
aversive psychological state, which people seek to compensate for by signaling that 
they are at par with (or better than) their rivals. Acquiring status is one way to 
demonstrate this to oneself and to the rival. Third, consumer products are one means 
to signal one’s status. Taking these different streams into consideration, we 
hypothesized that acquiring status-related consumer products is a means by which 
consumers attempt to compete with their rivals. Consequently, we predicted that when 
experiencing the advantageous position of a rival, individuals might be more likely to 
desire products that signal status to others (e.g., designer labels, executive pens) as 
evidenced by an increased willingness to pay for such goods. 
Overview of Present Research 
 
In the above section, we predicted that because rivalry involves a competition 
for status, and goods can be used to reflect status, rivalry would increase the desire for 
conspicuous goods. In a preliminary test of the hypotheses, we examined how the 
recall of a rival (versus a control peer) influenced participants’ willingness to pay for 
and evaluations of a desirable item possessed by the rival or peer, as well as their 
willingness to pay for items that varied in their ability to convey status. In Study 2, we 
further explored the relationship between consumption and rivalry by manipulating 
both rivalry and object status to examine whether object status and rivalry interact to 
predict willingness to pay. We expected an interaction between rivalry and object 
status, such that participants in the rivalry condition would have a higher willingness 
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to pay than would other participants, but only for goods high in status. The current 
further examined the role that affect plays in the relationship between rivalry and 
consumption and examined whether anticipated happiness upon purchase mediated the 
relationship between rivalry and consumption. 
Study 1: Does Rivalry Increase Conspicuous Consumption? 
 
The effects of rival’s possession of a favorable item or attribute on subsequent 
consumption are unclear. Thus, the current study was an initial examination of the 
relationship between rivalry and conspicuous consumption. Under the guise of two 
separate research projects, one investigating “the impact of relationships on perceptual 
processes”, and the other investigating “economic decision-making”, participants first 
completed a recall task originally used by Menon et al. (2006). For this task, 
participants were randomly assigned to describe a personal rival (i.e., “someone you 
have repeatedly competed against and/or were matched with”) or a control peer (i.e., 
“someone you have repeatedly worked together with or cooperated with”). 
Participants then read about a situation in which the other (rival or control peer) has 
come to possess a desirable item—an iPad 2 tablet computer. To test whether rivals 
desire similarly high status, but different products, we then examined the impact of a 
rival owning a valuable item on subsequent ratings of wanting (i.e., willingness to pay 
for the item) and liking of the item (i.e., favorable or unfavorable evaluations of the 
item). Past research has successfully used willingness to pay as a measure of wanting 
of the item (e.g., Litt et al., 2010).  In contrast, evaluations of the possession represent 
explicit feelings toward the item, which reflect of how individuals feel about the 
outcome itself, as opposed to their desire and persistence to obtain the outcome (Litt et 
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al., 2010). In addition, participants indicated their willingness to pay for items that 
vary in their abilities to convey status. To rule out alternative explanations, we will 
also obtain measures of the asymmetry of the rivalry, and the tangible consequences of 
the past competition, and the degree to which participants the other to be a friend. 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
65 undergraduates at a large Northeastern university participated in the study. 
Participants received 0.5 course credits for their participation in the study, which 
lasted approximately 15 minutes. Participants received $10 for their participation in 
the study, which lasted approximately 20 minutes. The sample consisted of 52.3% 
females, 6.7% African Americans, 50% European Americans, 31.7% Asians, 5% East 
Indians, and 5% Hispanics. The remaining 1.7% of the sample identified themselves 
as “other.” 
 
Measures (see Appendix) 
 
Control Variables. Because the asymmetry of a social comparison can 
influence the degree of self-threat experienced (e.g., Tesser, 1988), participants 
indicated to what extent they have succeeded or “won” in the past competition with 
the rival on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). In addition, because the 
tangible stakes of the competition may influence the intensity of the affect experienced 
(e.g., Kilduff et al., 2010), we asked participants to indicate how high the tangible 
stakes (e.g., money, career success, grades, broader reputational benefits, etc.) were 
associated with the competition on a scale from 1 (Not at all high) to 7 (Very high). 
Finally, because differing levels of closeness may exist among rivals and cooperative 
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peers, participants indicated the extent to which they considered the person to be a 
friend on a scale from 1 (Not a friend) to 7 (My best friend). 
Willingness-to-Pay (WTP). Participants will indicate how much they would 
pay for the items in United States dollars (USD). 
Evaluations of Object. To assess liking of the object, participants will indicate 
their agreement with 3 items (e.g., “The iPad 2 is a desirable product”) on a 7-point 
scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). After reverse scoring one item (i.e., 
“the iPad 2 is overrated”), the sum of the 3 items served as an index of object 
evaluation. The evaluation scale had acceptable inter-item reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .84). 
Procedure 
 
Upon arrival, all participants were escorted to a separate computer room and 
told that they were going to complete two studies. All participants received two 
packets of material, ostensibly for each study. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two conditions (rivalry: personal rival vs. control peer) representing the 
manipulation of the independent variable in a between-subjects design. To manipulate 
rivalry, we used a method adapted from Menon et al. (2006), in which participants 
were randomly assigned to describe a personal rival (i.e., “someone you have 
repeatedly competed against and/or were matched with”) or a control peer (i.e., 
“someone you have repeatedly worked together with or cooperated with”). 
Participants wrote about how they felt about this person, which served to increase the 
realism of the experimental manipulations. They then completed the control measures. 
After this, participants read a vignette in which the recalled individual has come to 
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obtain a desirable possession. Specifically, the other has acquired an iPad 2 tablet 
comptuer. Participants were told about the beneficial features of the iPad 2. Moreover, 
at the time of data collection, the iPad 2 was released and difficult to purchase, with 
many Apple outlets running out of the tablet and its accessories within 10 minutes of 
release (“iPad 2 Sales Stun,” 2011). Given the favorable public response to the iPad, 
we suspected that the item would be desirable to the participants. Further, because 
conspicuous consumption is more likely for products that are exclusive and visible 
(Bearden & Etzel, 1982; Solomon, 1983), the iPad 2 seemed appropriate. Finally, 
because the item was new at data collection, it likely did not represent an item already 
possessed by the rivals or an item for which they have previously competed. 
To prevent suspicion of the hypotheses, participants then completed a filler task 
in which they read and answered questions about a newspaper article. The 
experimenter then informed participants that a second study was to begin, ostensibly 
examining consumers’ bidding for products in different contexts. Participants then 
indicated their willingness to pay after seeing each product. Participants indicated their 
willingness to pay for six items: the iPad 2, designer sunglasses, a new vacuum, a boat 
trip of a local lake, a trip to Hawaii, and a concert of the participants’ choosing. Past 
research using a similar sample found that participants rated designer sunglasses as 
conveying significantly more status than do the other items (e.g., Polman & Khan, 
2011). Although some items (e.g., trip to Hawaii) may be related to status, the 
sunglasses are the most visible, and thus most likely to be conspicuous (see Braun & 
Wicklund, 1989, for a full discussion on the distinction between conspicuous and 
status purchases). Moreover, the inclusion of the other items may serve to rule out an 
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alternative hypothesis—that is, recalling a rivalry increases the desire to consume in 
general (cf., misery-is-not-miserly; Lerner et al., 2004). Further, participants made 
evaluations of the iPad 2 in order to examine whether they do, in fact, derogate the 
rival’s possession. 
Before leaving the lab, participants completed the demographic questions. In 
order to examine for awareness of the hypotheses, I used a funneled debriefing 
technique (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000); the experimenter first asked participants what 
they thought the study was about and if they found any procedures or instructions 
unusual or confusing. Finally, the experimenter fully debriefed each participant and 
thanked her for her time. 
Results and Discussion 
 
Gender and race did not interact with any of the measures in this or the next 
study. Thus, all analyses are reported without mention of gender and race. 
Wanting and Liking of a Rivals’ Possession. We conducted an independent 
samples t-test to examine differences in willingness to pay for the rival’s possession as 
well as evaluations of the possession. An independent samples t-test revealed no 
significant differences between rivalry and control peer conditions, t(62) = .74, p = 
.46. Consistent with our prediction that rivals would derogate the other’s item, 
however, participants in the rivalry condition gave significantly lower evaluations of 
the object (M = 9.32, SD = 4.41) than did participants in the control peer condition (M 
= 12.25, SD = 4.03), t(63) = 2.89, p = .005. 
Conspicuous Consumption. In order to examine differences in willingness to pay 
between the peer and rival groups, independent samples t-tests were conducted. First, 
 
 
 
29 
given a violation of Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances, F(1, 62) = 9.10, p = 
 
.004, a t-test not assuming homogenous variances was calculated. The results of this 
test revealed that participants in the rivalry condition were willing to pay significantly 
more (M = $170.33, SD = 139.36) for the designer sunglasses than were participants in 
the peer condition (M = $95.00, SD = 82.19), t(62) = 2.60, p = .01. No other 
significant differences emerged between conditions in predicting willingness to pay 
for the items, ts < 1, ps > .05. 
Control Variables. The tangible stakes, success, and, friendship measures did not 
significantly differ between conditions, ts < 1, ps > .05. Further, including these 
variables in analyses of covariance examining the effects of rivalry condition on 
willingness to pay did not change the aforementioned results. 
The results of Study 1supported our hypotheses that rivalry can lead to the 
derogation of a rival other’s possessions and to an increase in conspicuous 
consumption. However, the results of Study 1did not find that rivalry leads to an 
increased wanting of (i.e., willingness to pay for) a rival’s item. Thus, the results of 
Study 1 are consistent with social differentiation. Buying a different, but high status 
good likely resolves the frustration of being inferior, and serves to differentiate the self 
from the rival other. In contrast, obtaining the rival’s product might signal that the 
product is attractive and desirable, thus potentially perpetuating the rival’s ostensible 
advantage. Social differentiation allows people to stop comparing themselves to 
another person in the domain in which they are outperformed and look for another 
area in which they can outperform the rival. Thus, while acquiring an iPad 2 
 
represented a high status technology acquisition, acquiring designer sunglasses may 
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provide an advantage in the realm of conspicuous fashion. 
 
However, the first experiment relied upon the natural association of different 
products with different levels of status. Although the use of natural associations with 
status speaks to the ecological validity of the research, it remains possible that low and 
high status products selected varied on some dimension besides status. Thus, Study 2 
was conducted to provide a more unequivocal test of the relationship between rivalry 
and conspicuous consumption. Study 2 also included a pure control condition to 
clarify whether the effects of Study 2 were driven primarily by rivalry or cooperation 
effects. Finally, to explore the role of affect in the relationship between the variables, 
we tested whether conspicuously consuming operates as a way for participants to 
remove the discomfort associated with rivalry by exploring participants’ envy and 
anticipated happiness following a hypothetical purchase. 
Study 2: Rivalry and Conspicuous Consumption 
 
In the current study, we performed an experiment to show more directly that 
rivalry influences conspicuous consumption. To do so, we manipulated whether the 
same item was portrayed as being either weakly (low status condition) or strongly 
(high status condition) associated with status, and whether participants recalled a rival 
(rivalry condition), a cooperative peer (control peer condition), or what they did 
yesterday (control condition). We predicted that rivalry condition and object status 
would interact to predict participants’ willingness to pay for the object, such that 
participants in the rivalry condition would have a higher willingness to pay than would 
control participants, but only for an object of high status. Because we suspect that 
faring poorly to a rival is an aversive state, leading people to experience the negative 
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emotion of envy, we suspect that they will be motivated to reduce that state. Given 
that individuals may view status goods as instrumental to reducing the status 
imbalance between the self and the other, rivals may see status goods as more valuable 
than will others. Consequently, rivals may predict experiencing greater pleasure upon 
attaining status goods. Thus, through meditational analyses, we also sought to show 
that these differences in willingness to pay would arise because participants in the 
rivalry condition expect high status good to improve their moods. To do so, we 
included a measure of anticipated happiness participants expected to receive from 
acquiring the product. Finally, we also conducted an initial exploration of the 
relationship between rivalry and envy. As stated earlier, the comparative nature of 
rivalry may lead rival individuals to experience increased envy at the other’s success. 
We predicted that rivalry would increase the experience of envy, but that rivalry 
would still predict willingness to pay for status goods after controlling for this affect. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
199 participants (male = 71; female = 128) were obtained for Study 2 via a 
 
national online sample on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (see  www.mturk.com). 
 
Participant received $1.00 for their participation in the study, which will last 
approximately 10 minutes. This payment is consistent with the compensation typically 
provided to Mechnical Turk participants (Paolacci, Chandler, & Iperiotis, 2010). The 
sample had a mean age of 34 (range 18-63, SD = 11.95). The use of Mechanical Turk 
participants has been shown to be as representative of the U.S. population as 
traditional subject pools (e.g., Erikson & Simpson, 2010; Paolacci et al., 2010). 
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Moreover, recent research by Paolacci et al. (2010) replicated a series of classic 
experiments in judgment and decision-making and found no differences in the 
magnitude of effects obtained using Mechanical Turk and using traditional subject 
pools. Thus, the sample is appropriate to address the current hypotheses. 
Measures (see Appendix A for all study materials) 
 
Demographic questionnaire. Participants indicated their age and gender. 
 
Envy. To assess affect in response to the vignette, participants completed a 8- 
item measure of affect. Participants indicated the degree to which they were 
experiencing each of 10 adjectives indicative of affect (e.g., “jealous”), at the moment, 
on a 5-point scale from 1 (not felt at all) to 5 (strongly felt). Consistent with van de 
Ven’s (2010) suggestions, participants reported their current feelings; in particular, 
four items related to malicious envy (unhappy, resentment, frustrated, and jealous, α = 
0.81), and four items related to benign envy (inspired, excited, pleased, and motivated, 
α = .85)1. The sum of the four items served as indexes of malicious and benign envy, 
with higher scores indicating higher levels of envy. We also conducted a factor 
analysis to determine the best factor structure for this scale. A principle axis factor 
analysis indicated that a two-factor structure yielded the most interpretable solution in 
terms of the factor loadings, and in a scree plot, the two-factor model marked the last 
substantial drop in the magnitude of the eigenvalues. Furthermore, in a two-factor 
solution, all of the factor loadings were above 0.40. Participants had a mean malicious 
envy score of 7.55 (SD = .257), ranging from 4 to 20, and a mean benign envy score 
of 10.10 (SD = .41), ranging from 4 to 20. 
 
1  The word envy was not included in the analyses because it is used to denote both malicious 
and benign envy in the English language (see van de Ven et al., 2009). 
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Anticipated Happiness. To assess whether conspicuous consumption may serve 
to repair mood, participants indicated the degree to which they thought purchasing the 
watch would make them happy on a scale from 1 (Not at all happy) to 7 (Extremely 
happy). 
Control Variables. Because the asymmetry of a social comparison can 
influence the degree of self-threat experienced (e.g., Tesser, 1988), participants 
indicated to what extent they have succeeded or “won” in the past competition with 
the rival on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). In addition, because the 
tangible stakes of the competition may influence the intensity of the affect experienced 
(e.g., Kilduff et al., 2010), we asked participants to indicate how high the tangible 
stakes (e.g., money, career success, grades, broader reputational benefits, etc.) were 
associated with the competition on a scale from 1 (Not at all high) to 7 (Very high). 
Finally, because differing levels of closeness may exist among rivals and cooperative 
peers, participants indicated the extent to which they considered the person to be a 
friend on a scale from 1 (Not a friend) to 7 (My best friend). 
Manipulations 
 
Rivalry. To manipulate rivalry, we again used a method adapted from Menon 
 
et al. (2006), in which participants were randomly assigned to describe a personal rival 
(i.e., “someone you have repeatedly competed against and/or were matched with”), a 
control peer (i.e., “someone you have repeatedly worked together with or cooperated 
with”), or a control condition (i.e., “describe the last time you went to the grocery 
store”). Participants wrote about how they felt about this person, which will serve to 
increase the realism of the experimental manipulations. 
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Status Good. Under the guise of a separate research study investigating consumers’ 
 
bidding for products in different contexts, participants were then asked to think about 
a watch that was exclusive and owned by only a very select group of people (high 
status object) or a watch that was common and worn by many people (low status 
object) (Rucker & Galinsky, 2008). Participants then reported the maximum 
percentage of the retail price that they would be willing to pay to obtain this watch, 
from 1 (10%) to 12 (120%)
2
. 
 
Procedure 
 
To prevent awareness of the hypotheses, all participants read that they were to 
complete two separate studies. The instructions indicated that the first study was 
exploring how individuals’ daily experiences affect their feelings and product 
perceptions and the second was examining how individuals’ bidding for various 
products
3
. Using randomization by blocks, participants were assigned to one of six 
conditions representing the manipulation of the independent variables in a 3 (rivalry: 
rival vs. control peer vs. control) x 2 (object status: low status vs. high status) 
between-subjects design. Participants first completed the recall task designed to 
manipulate rivalry adapted from Menon et al. (2005). Participants in the rivalry and 
control peer conditions then completed the control measures. After this, participants 
read a vignette in which the recalled individual has come to obtain a desirable 
possession. As in Study 1, the other has acquired an iPad 2 tablet computer. 
 
 
2  
A potential problem of Study 1 was that participants were presented with products from a 
variety of price tiers, which may have introduced added variance. Thus, Study 2 used an 
interval scale to reduce the amount of response variance and to guard against outliers. 
 
3  
Of import, no participants correctly guessed the experimental hypotheses in an open-ended 
question that asked participants to guess what the study. 
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Following the vignette, participants completed the affect measure. To remove 
suspicion of the hypotheses, participants then completed a filler task consisting of 
three anagrams. Participants then received instructions for the ostensibly unrelated 
second study interested in examining consumers’ bidding for products in different 
contexts. Participants were told to imagine that they had decided to treat themselves 
and were then presented with an item that they might consider purchasing. Participants 
in the high status object condition read about a Swiss luxury watch worn by a very 
select group of people. Participants in the no status object condition read about a 
watch made by a large American manufacturer that is common and worn by many 
people. Participants indicated their willingness to pay for the item. Following this, 
participants completed the anticipated happiness measure. 
Finally, participants completed the demographic questions and indicated 
whether they own an iPad 2. In order to examine for awareness of the hypotheses, 
participants answered an open-ended question asking them what the research was 
about (c.f., Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Each participant was then thanked for his or her 
time. 
Results and Discussion 
 
Prior to analysis, three participants’ data were removed from the analyses. One 
participant indicated that she had never experienced a rivalry and two participants 
discussed a one-off competition rather than a rival with whom they repeatedly 
competed against. 
Primary Analyses. To examine the effects of rivalry and object status on 
 
willingness to pay, we conducted a 3 (rivalry: rival vs. control peer vs. control) x 2 
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(object status: low status vs. high status) two-way ANOVA on the willingness to pay 
measure. There was no main effect of rivalry, F(2, 193) = 1.16, p = .32. There was a 
main effect of object status, such that participants indicated a willingness to pay more 
of the retail value of products low in status association (M = 54.70%, SD = 2.92) 
compared to those highly associated with status (M = 47.10%, SD = 2.38), F(1, 193) = 
5.81, p = .02, perhaps because the retail price of the high status object was assumed to 
be much higher than the cost of the low status object, making it less affordable to our 
population.  This main effect was qualified by a significant rivalry x object status 
interaction, F(2, 193) = 3.22, p < .04 (see Figure 1). Deconstructing this interaction 
revealed, for the low status object, that participants did not differ in their willingness 
to pay as a function of control (M = 55.45%, SD = 3.82), control peer (M = 57.45%, 
SD = 3.76), or rivalry (M = 52.73, SD = 3.82) conditions, F(2, 97) = .38, p = .69. In 
contrast, for the high status object, there was a significant effect, F(2, 96) = 3.54, p = 
.03. Participants in the rivalry condition were willing to pay significantly more for the 
watch (M = 56.67%, SD = 4.42) than were participants in the control peer (M = 
42.42%, SD = 4.42), t(64) = 2.28, p = .02, or control (M = 42.12%, SD = 4.42), t(65) = 
 
2.33, p = .02, conditions. The control and control peer conditions did not differ, F < 1. 
The results of Study 2 again suggest that the valuation of high status goods increases 
in the context of rivalry. 
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Figure 1. The effects of rivalry condition on willingness to pay (percentage of retail 
price), as a function of the status associated with the watch. 
 
 
 
Mediation. Following the procedures of Baron and Kenny (1986), we 
conducted a simultaneous regression of willingness to pay on rivalry condition and 
happiness. First, rivalry condition significantly predicted participants’ anticipated 
happiness from acquiring the high status good, B = .48, p = .02. Participants’ 
perception of the extent to which the object provided happiness significantly predicted 
their willingness to pay, B = .72, p < .001, but the rivalry manipulation no longer 
exerted a significant effect, B  = .19, p = .08 (see Figure 2). Finally, we found overall 
significance of the indirect effect (i.e., the path through the mediator), Sobel test = 
2.00, p = .05, thus indicating that anticipated happiness mediated the relationship 
 
between rivalry and conspicuous consumption. 
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Figure 2. Mediation of rivalry on willingness to pay via anticipated happiness, Study 
 
2. Note—*p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
Control Variables. To examine possible alternative explanations, we examined 
the role of tangible stakes, success, and friendship in predicting the dependent 
variables. We conducted separate analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) examining the 
effects of rivalry condition and watch condition on willingness to pay, while 
controlling for these variables, and again found the significant main effect for watch 
condition, Fs > 1, ps < .05, and significant interactions between rivalry condition and 
watch condition in predicting willingness to pay, Fs > 1, ps < .05. 
Benign and Malicious Envy. We also conducted a one-way ANOVA 
examining the impact of rivalry condition on the reported benign and malicious envy. 
There was a significant effect of rivalry on malicious envy, F(2, 193) = 5.71, p = .004. 
Follow-up tests revealed that participants in the rivalry condition experienced 
significantly more malicious envy (M = 8.76, SD = .62) than did participants in the 
control peer (M = 6.79, SD = .62), t(65) = 3.15, p < .01, or control (M = 7.10, SD = 
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.63) conditions, t(65) = 2.62, p = .02. The control peer and control conditions did not 
differ significantly, t(65) = 0.48, p = .88. Similarly, there was a significant effect of 
rivalry on benign envy, F(2, 193) = 3.71, p = .03. Follow-up tests revealed that 
participants in the cooperative peer condition experienced significantly more benign 
envy (M = 11.01, SD = 4.14) than did participants in the control condition (M = 9.08, 
SD = 4.02), t(65) = 2.72, p  = .02. Participants in the rivalry condition (M = 10.17, SD 
= 4.13) did not significantly differ from either control conditions, ts < 1, ps < .05. 
 
Of import, however, including benign and malicious envy in an ANCOVA did 
not remove the significant interaction between rivalry and object status in predicting 
willingness to pay, F(2, 193) = 3.10, p < .05. Further, neither malicious nor benign 
envy had effects on willingness to pay for the status watch, B < .07, p > .49, and 
consequently were not examined as potential mediators of the relationship between 
rivalry and willingness to pay. Thus, the results suggest that rivals do experienced 
increased malicious envy, but rivalry still predicts willingness to pay for status objects 
above and beyond the experience of affect. 
The results of Study 2 provide further evidence for our prediction that rivalry 
increases conspicuous consumption. Supporting the role of status, the same product 
increased rivals willingness to pay, but only when the product was portrayed as unique 
and scarce and, thus, as having high status (cf., Rucker & Galinsky, 2008). When the 
watch was represented as relatively common and thus weakly associated with status, 
rivalry did not influence willingness to pay. 
Finally, we found evidence that participants increased their spending limits 
 
based on the perception that the product would make them happier. Perhaps 
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individuals experiencing the advantage of a rival anticipate greater happiness from a 
status object because of the perception that acquiring a status product will remove the 
current status imbalance and the associated negative affect. 
General Discussion 
 
Over a century ago, William James (1890) posited that material goods play a 
crucial role in defining the self. Indeed, James suggested that “a man’s Self is the sum 
total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and psychic powers, but his clothes 
and his house…his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account. All these things 
give him the same emotions” (James, 1890, p. 291). Despite James’s work being 
among the most influential in psychology, a surprising lack of empirical work has 
connected social psychological factors to conspicuous consumption. The current 
research contributes to this line of research by suggesting that interpersonal rivalries 
may contribute to the tendency to engage in conspicuous consumption. We argued that 
a rival’s acquisition of a favorable item would be viewed as a threat to the self and the 
self’s status and may elicit envy. In order to remove the negative feelings associated 
with this state, individuals may seek to demonstrate status. Given that products can 
conspicuously convey status, we predicted that these rivals would be more likely to 
engage in conspicuous consumption. 
Across two experiments, we found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
rivalry would engender conspicuous consumption. In Study 1, participants considered 
a rival or cooperative peer’s acquisition of an iPad 2—a highly rated and exclusive 
item. Participants in the rivalry condition had a higher willingness to pay for a 
conspicuous good (i.e., designer sunglasses), but not a good already possessed by the 
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rival (i.e., the iPad 2). Rivals also did not demonstrate a higher willingness to pay for 
goods that did not display status (i.e., a new vacuum, a boat trip of a local lake, a trip 
to Hawaii, and a concert of the participants’ choosing). This preliminary examination 
provided support for the role of rivalry in generated conspicuous consumption. 
One reason for the desire to acquire a different, high status object may be social 
differentiation. It is possible that thinking about a rival engenders a motivation for 
differentiation from others rather than assimilation. According to Brewer’s (1991) 
model of optimal distinctiveness, individuals’ identities are a reconciliation of 
opposing needs for assimilation and differentiation from others. Further, which need is 
active is dependent on the characteristics of the social context (e.g., Gaertner et al., 
1999). For example, in an intergroup context, the need for assimilation to the in-group 
may be primary, whereas in an intragroup context, the need for social differentiation 
may be primary (e.g., Lewis, 2001). Because a threatening source of social 
comparison can cast doubt on an individual’s own distinctiveness and competence 
(Blau, 1995; Lee, 1997), rivalry may increase the need for successful differentiation 
from the other.  Future research may more closely examine the motivational primacy 
of the individual self in rivalry. 
Another reason that rivals desire social differentiation may be that acquiring a 
possession or skill after the rival may lead the individual to be labeled a ‘follower’, 
which can be a source of stigma to the self or others (e.g., Meindl, 1987). We live in 
an era that values creativity and novelty, and recycling ideas or products may not be a 
good self-enhancing strategy. Thus, individuals may (appropriately) fear that acquiring 
 
a rival’s possessions may acknowledge the rival’s superiority and signal deference to 
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the rival (Menon & Pfeffer, 2003), thus devaluing the self. In other words, people 
engaged in a rivalry may fear being labeled a “copycat”. Examining the negative 
feelings associated with acquiring an item or skill after a rival is an area for future 
exploration. 
The results of Study 2 provided further support for our hypothesis that rivalry 
would increase conspicuous consumption by demonstrating that rivalry increased 
willingness to pay, but only for a high status product. This finding suggests that a 
rival’s advantage does not predict spending per se (cf., misery-is-not-miserly effect; 
Lerner et al., 2004), but rather predicts the consumption of status products. Moreover, 
the results of the study demonstrated that these effects were mediated by the 
anticipated happiness of the purchase. Participants in the rivalry condition also 
experienced significantly more malicious, but not benign, envy than did other 
participants. However, the experience of malicious envy did not mediate or moderate 
the relationship between rivalry condition and willingness to pay, though the tendency 
for malicious envy to predict willingness to pay was marginal, B = .13, p = .08. 
Further, although we anticipated that the aversive experience of malicious envy may 
lead participants to anticipate greater happiness from acquiring a high status object, 
malicious envy did not predict anticipated happiness, B = .04, p = .36. Thus, the 
mechanism behind this effect remains uncertain. We propose a working model (see 
Fig. 3), which suggests that both cognitive and affective factors predict willingness to 
pay for a status good following rivalry. That is, the envy associated with a rival’s 
advantage may work in concert with individuals’ perception of a status loss to predict 
conspicuous consumption. Given that perceptions of status and power are relative 
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(e.g., Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006; Berger, Rosenholtz, & 
Zelditch, 1980), the status gain conferred by a rival’s acquisition may lead to 
perceived status loss on the part of the individual. Recent research has also promoted a 
compensatory view of power and status, such that low power and status are aversive 
states that drive behaviors intended to gain power and status (e.g., Rucker & Galinsky, 
2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Thus, perhaps perceived status loss and envy work 
together to predict actions aimed at restoring this imbalance, such as acquiring status 
goods. Future research may explore whether a rival’s advantage affects people’s 
perception of how possessing a high status product will affect their own sense of 
status. 
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Figure 3. A conceptual model of how rivalry influences conspicuous consumption. 
 
Envy 
 
The results of the current study indicated that participants in the rivalry condition 
were significantly more likely to experience malicious envy than were participants in 
either of the control conditions. Prior work by van de Ven et al. (2009) has suggested 
that malicious envy leads to a pulling-down motivation aimed at damaging the 
position of the superior other, whereas the experience of benign envy leads to a 
moving-up motivation aimed at improving one’s own position. A main distinction 
between the types of envy is based upon the presence or absence of hostility, with 
malicious envy having a component of hostility. In addition, malicious envy is more 
associated with the experience of resentment, whereas benign envy is more associated 
with the experience of admiration. Given our suggestion that it is not in an individual’s 
advantage to acknowledge his or her rival’s superior position, it is plausible that 
malicious envy is more likely to occur in the context of rivalry. Malicious envy 
motivates the individual to reduce the difference between the self and the rival, but 
also allows the individual to avoid deference to the rival. However, the current study 
was only a preliminary examination of the relationship between the types of envy and 
rivalry, and these suggestions are speculative. 
Indeed, rivals and control peers did not differ significantly in their experience of 
benign envy. It is likely that many variables moderate the relationship between rivalry 
and the types of envy. For example, as stated previously, we do not rule out the 
possibility of asymmetrical rivalries. In fact, Kilduff et al. (2010) found that many of 
the NCAA teams perceived rivalries with higher ranked teams—teams which did not 
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view the lower ranked teams as rivals. Such asymmetrical rivalries may be used for 
motivational purposes, and given that benign envy is associated with a desire for self- 
improvement, a consistently superior rival may increase the experience of benign 
envy. In addition, returning to Tesser’s (1988) SEM model, a rival’s advantage may 
lead to benign envy if the rival has accomplished something that is not important to 
the self. That is, following a rival’s success in an unimportant domain, an individual 
may experience envy because of the nature of the relationship, but because it is not 
self-threatening, he or she may not be driven to derogate the success. 
Implications 
 
Although the current studies took place in a laboratory setting, the results have 
important practical implications. First, these findings demonstrate how rivalry can 
steer decisions in important domains of life, such as consumption decisions, that have 
significant collective consequences (Golub, 2008). The tendency for individuals’ need 
to compete to overtake rational consumption decisions both highlights the challenges 
involved in reducing overspending on conspicuous goods and may help to explain 
why current economic incentives, directed at encouraging individuals in debt to 
increase their savings, have had little success (Engen, Gale, & Scholz, 1996). That is, 
the motivation to reduce the aversive state associated with faring poorly to a rival may 
encourage individuals to continuously pour money into unnecessary purchases, even at 
a cost to the self. Thus, in addition to investigating the consequences of rivalry for the 
perception of product value, the research may provide a plausible mechanism 
underlying phenomena like keeping-up-with-the-Joneses. Although research on 
keeping-up-with-the-Joneses found that people base their needs and wants on what 
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they lack compared to relevant others (e.g., Frank, 1999), it remained unclear under 
which conditions these relevant others would exert influence. The current research 
suggests that a history of competition may be a key aspect in determining whether 
people are influenced by the possessions of others. 
More generally, despite much anecdotal evidence of the power of rivalry, little 
research has explored its psychological consequences. The current research has the 
potential to contribute to our understanding of rivalry as a relational phenomenon. 
Despite the motivational benefits of rivalry, it may lead to non-rational behaviors and 
result in an actor not achieving the results otherwise possible. Demonstrating the non- 
rational side of rivalry may suggest that practitioners should be wary about fostering 
rivalry among employees in the workplace. This empirical evidence is of high 
importance, given the recent push toward the use of rankings to scale employee 
performance relative to that of their peers instead of using predetermined task goals 
(Grote, 2005). Rather than improving performance, such ranking systems may produce 
rivalries, which could inhibit cooperation among employees and limit employees’ 
willingness to maximize joint gains that will benefit the organization. Further, the 
current study found that participants who recalled a rivalry were more likely to report 
experiencing malicious, as opposed to benign, envy. Of import, recent research has 
linked malicious envy to dishonesty and unethical behavior (e.g., Gino & Pierce, 
2009; Moran & Schweitzer, 2008). If workplace rivals experience malicious envy 
following the other’s success, it may lead to a “win at all costs” approach to 
competition, subsequently increasing the likelihood of unethical behaviors. In contrast, 
the benign envy experienced by cooperative peers has been found to led to an increase 
 
 
 
47 
in moral behaviors, as it involves a motivation to “level up” to the other (Polman & 
 
Ruttan, 2011). 
 
Limitations 
 
The current research has some limitations that warrant discussion. First, we only 
asked participants what they would be willing to pay for products, but their decision 
had no real consequences for them. Thus, although the results suggest that a rival’s 
favorable acquisition may elicit conspicuous consumption, it remains unclear whether 
these effects will hold when consumers really expect to pay these prices. Future 
research may serve to address this limitation by assessing real purchasing decisions. 
Next, only an iPad 2 was used as the rival’s product. As previously stated, the iPad 
was chosen because, at the time of data collection, it was a highly desirable and 
exclusive product, and was unlikely to be currently owned by the participants. 
Individuals’ product preferences are highly diverse, and although person A may like 
the iPad 2, person B may not. Using one product, however, allowed for clean 
manipulations in which all participants read about the same product. Future research 
should assess whether the current effects will hold for other products acquired by the 
rival and examine which products are most likely to elicit rivals’ desires to 
conspicuously consume. 
In this vein, one might ask which products or possessions are actually likely to 
envy and conspicuous consumption? Given research on social comparison (e.g., 
Tesser, 1988) and conspicuous consumption (e.g., Bearden & Etzel, 1982), we suspect 
that (a) high status, visible, and (b) self-relevant items or skills will be most likely to 
elicit the found effects.  First, goods cannot be envied unless they are noticed and 
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exclusive. If the rival in the current study acquired a pencil, it would likely have had 
no effect on participants because pencils are common and do not represent any 
particular advantage possessed by the rival. Besides status and visibility, we suspect 
that high self-relevance could trigger these effects. First, according to Tesser’s (1988) 
Self-Evaluation Maintenance (SEM) Model, for competition to occur, the social 
comparison must be important to the self.  As Tesser’s (1988) SEM model posits, 
feelings of self-worth are enhanced or diminished by others’ performance according to 
(a) the individual’s relationship to the other and (b) the personal relevance of the 
dimension under consideration. Thus, if a rival comes to acquire a personally relevant 
possession or skill, it may also engender the tendency to engage in conspicuous 
consumption. For example, if one of two rival faculty members published in a 
prestigious journal, the other would like experience envy and self-threat. If the other 
did not see publishing in a similarly high status journal in his or her foreseeable future, 
conspicuous consumption may be an immediate and visible means of demonstrating 
status to the other. 
Finally, in the introduction, we suggested that rivals loom larger than do regular 
opponents or one-off competitors. However, the current study did not compare rivals 
to one-off competitors. Future research should empirically test the difference between 
rivals and competitors and also examine why such differences exist. 
Conclusion 
As ubiquitous as both rivalries and consumption are, little was known about how 
rival relationships influence consumption habits, such as individuals’ willingness to 
pay for high status goods. We have contributed to this gap in the literature by 
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suggesting that one key contributor to phenomena such as conspicuous consumption 
and keeping-up-with-the-Joneses may be the existence of rivalries between 
individuals. We provided initial evidence for this proposition and introduced a 
theoretical mechanism to explain the relationship between rivalry and consumption. 
To combat the aversive state of faring poorly compared to a rival, individuals come to 
prize objects that are likely to reduce the status imbalance between the self and the 
rival—that is, objects that conspicuously display status. Thus, following a 
disadvantage, rivals will not sit idly by, but instead will become motivated to buy. 
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APPENDIX: Experimental Materials 
 
Rivalry Condition 
 
1) Please think back to a time in which you competed against a personal rival (e.g., 
someone you repeatedly competed against and/or were evenly-matched with).  Please 
spend a few minutes describing this person and the thing(s) you competed on (1 – 2 
paragraphs).  How did you feel towards this person and while you competed against 
him or her?  Please try to remember and describe this experience as vividly as 
possible. 
 
[Note that this person should be a specific individual (as opposed to a group of 
individuals, or someone anonymous) who is not your significant other or a family 
member.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) To what extent did you “succeed” or win in this competition? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Very much 
 
3) How high were the tangible stakes (e.g., money, career success, grades, athletic 
success, broader reputational benefits, etc.) associated with this competition? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nothing tangible at stake Very high 
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4) To what extent do you consider this person to be a friend? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not a friend My best friend 
 
Control Peer Condition 
 
1) Please think back to a time in which you cooperated with a peer to achieve a goal 
(e.g., someone you repeatedly work with and/or were evenly-matched with).  Please 
spend a few minutes describing this person and the thing(s) you cooperated on (1 – 2 
paragraphs).  How did you feel towards this person and while you cooperated with 
him or her?  Please try to remember and describe this experience as vividly as 
possible. 
 
[Note that this person should be a specific individual (as opposed to a group of 
individuals, or someone anonymous) who is not your significant other or a family 
member.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2)  To what extent did you “succeed” or win at this task? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Very much 
 
3) How high were the tangible stakes (e.g., money, career success, grades, athletic 
success, broader reputational benefits, etc.) associated with this task? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nothing tangible at stake Very high 
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4) To what extent do you consider this person to be a friend? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not a friend My best friend 
 
Phase 1 Task 
Please enter the individual’s name that you previously described in the following text: 
Imagine a situation in which you come across the other. You are on your way to class, 
but    stops to talk to you. After exchanging hellos,   begins to tell 
you: 
“I just got the new iPad 2 and I love it. Once I picked it up, it was hard to put down. 
Look how small it is? You wouldn’t believe that it has two cameras for FaceTime and 
HD video recording. It has 10 hour battery life and is super fast. You can go online, 
check email, read books so easily. Anyway, I have to go, but you should really think 
about getting one…” 
 
 
 
Phase 2 Task 
 
In this phase of the study, you will do a Reading Task. During this phase, you will 
read an excerpt and answer various questions regarding the text. Some questions will 
ask you to recall the content of the excerpt, while others will assess your opinions on 
the topic. This task is interesting and educational; you can learn something from doing 
the task. 
 
 
 
Hippo, Warts and Other Thugs of the Genetic 
Realm 
 
By NICHOLAS WADE 
 
If you should ever have a heart attack, Hippo, Warts, Merlin, Yorkie, Scalloped, Shaggy, Frizzled, 
Dishevelled and Mob-as-tumor-suppressor may have a lot to do with why you don’t get better in a hurry. 
 
These are not characters from a Damon Runyon story but a crew of genes that work together to switch 
other genes on and off. A team of biologists led by James F. Martin and Todd Heallen of the Texas A&M 
System Health Science Center has now found that these genes block the heart from growing new heart 
muscle cells, at least in mice. 
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 Knock out Hippo, for example, and the mouse’s heart grows two and a half times bigger than usual, they 
report in Science. 
 
This and other advances, including the discovery this year that infant mice can regenerate their hearts for 
the first seven days after birth, is evoking considerable interest among researchers trying to develop new 
treatments for heart attacks. 
 
The findings “will mark a renaissance of interest in the genetics of cardiac muscle growth control because 
of the potential therapeutic applications,” said Michael D. Schneider, a heart biology expert at Imperial 
College in London. 
 
The reason that heart attacks are so serious is that when a large number of heart muscle cells die, they 
are not replaced. Yet the heart does slowly generate new muscle cells during a person’s lifetime, showing 
that a growth program is in place. It is firmly repressed, however, presumably to avert the danger of 
cancer. 
 
Surgeons have tried injecting stem cells of all kinds into stricken hearts, but despite many clinical trials, 
there is little evidence that the cells do much good. This setback has led to renewed interest in trying to 
unlock the heart cells’ inherent growth program. 
 
Dr. Martin started with the Hippo gene because it is known to regulate the size of a fruit fly’s organs. 
Fruit fly biologists are often the first to recognize new genes and to work out what they do. The names 
they confer on genes are colorful and often grotesque because they are inspired by what happens to the 
fly when you knock out a specific gene from its genome. 
 
If you delete the Hippo gene, the fruit fly grows an enormous head with folded skin around the neck. 
Hence Hippo. 
 
By engineering a mouse in which Hippo was deleted just in the heart, Dr. Martin’s team showed that the 
chain of genes in which Hippo acts serves as at least one of the natural restraints on the proliferation of 
heart muscle cells. 
 
Zebra fish can regenerate the tip of the heart when it is cut off. Researchers have recently found the fish 
can even replace the scar tissue that forms when muscle cells die, which is often a problem for failing 
human hearts. The finding that infant mice can also regenerate the heart means that mammals, perhaps 
including people, may also have this ability, even though it is lost in adults. 
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 If the mouse and zebra fish have some natural way of escaping the Hippo gene’s clamp on heart cell 
growth, it is possible that some drug could be developed that would close down the Hippo pathway in 
people for a few days after a heart attack, allowing the heart muscle cells to enjoy a much-needed spurt of 
proliferation. 
 
Dr. Martin said his next step would be to grow adult mice with a disabled Hippo gene and see if they 
recover faster after a heart attack. He also plans to see if human heart muscle cells grown in a laboratory 
dish proliferate better if the Hippo pathway is disrupted. 
 
In fruit flies, an organ can produce more cells only if two gene promoters, called Yorkie and Armadillo, 
get to penetrate the cell’s nucleus and switch on the suites of genes required for the cells to grow and 
divide. But when Hippo is active neither Yorkie nor Armadillo can do its work. The signal that activates 
Hippo in the fly is called Dachsous, which must first trigger a receptor protein called Fat in the cell’s 
surface. But receptors like Fat can respond to many different signals. So it is not yet clear that the mouse 
or human counterparts to Dachsous and Fat are the triggers for the effect Dr. Martin’s team has seen, Dr. 
Schneider said. 
 
If the human counterparts are identified, then a drug that blocked them, switching off Hippo, might let 
heart muscle cells regenerate themselves, leading to a novel and fundamental treatment for heart attacks. 
 
But Hippo, Warts, Merlin and crew would not be part of the story. When mouse researchers look for the 
counterparts of fruit fly genes in mice, they give them new and duller names. Human geneticists are even 
more fearful that colorful gene names will create an aura of frivolity that discourages serious grant 
money. “They ruin it,” Dr. Martin said. The gene that fly biologists call Ménage-à-trois 1 is called MAT 1 
by human geneticists. The poetically named Son-of-Sevenless in flies is the prosaic SOS 1 in people. As 
for Hippo, mouse researchers have already decolorized it to MST 1. 
 
 
 
Article from the New York Times (April 25, 2011) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/science/26heart.html?_r=1&ref=science 
 
 
 
Phase 2 Questionnaire 
1.  According to the author, what happens when the Hippo gene is removed: 
a)  The heart grows in size 
b)   The heart shrinks in size 
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c)  The gene has no effect on heart size 
 
Please indicate your agreement with the following statements: 
2.  In general, the above passage was well written. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Very Much 
3.  Many people would be interested in reading this story. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
Disagree 
Completely 
Agree 
 
4.  The government should increase funding of genetic research. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
 
5.  Genetic research has made substantial strides in recent years. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
disagree 
1.  Gene names should be kept ‘uncolorful’. 
Completely 
agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Completely 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
 
Study 2 
 
In this study, please indicate your preferences for various products. Now, imagine that 
you have decided to treat yourself. Below are items that you might consider 
purchasing. 
 
 
 
What is the maximum amount of money you would be willing to pay for a pair of 
designer sunglasses? 
 
 
 
What is the maximum amount of money you would be willing to pay for an all- 
inclusive trip to Hawaii? 
 
 
 
What is the maximum amount of money you would be willing to pay for an iPad 2? 
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What is the maximum amount of money you would be willing to pay to go to the 
concert of your choice? 
 
 
 
What is the maximum amount of money you would be willing to pay for a new 
upright vacuum cleaner? 
 
Post Questionnaire 
A. Please indicate your agreement with the following statements: 
 
The iPad2 is a desirable product. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
The iPad2 will be important to have. 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
The iPad 2 is overrated. 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Very 
Much 
B.   Study Purpose 
 
If you think that you can guess what this study was about, please write it on the lines 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.   Personal Identification 
 
Net ID:    
Student ID#:     
D.   Demographics 
1. Your year in college:    Freshman    Sophomore   Junior    Senior 
 
2. You are:     Male 
3. Your birth year: 19   
  Female 
4. Your ethnic identity (if multiple try to select the one you identify most strongly 
with)? 
   African-American/Black   Asian-American/Asian 
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  European-American/White 
  Native American 
   East Indian 
  Hispanic/Latino/Chicano 
  Other (please specify)    
Study 2 
 
Control Condition 
 
Phase 1 Task 
 
1) Please describe what you did yesterday. Please spend a few minutes describing the 
day, the things you did, and the events that occurred (1 – 2 paragraphs).  Please try to 
remember and describe this experience as vividly as possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 1 Task 
Please imagine the following encounter: 
 
You are on your way to class, but    stops to talk to you. After exchanging hellos, 
he or she begins to tell you: 
 
“I just got the new iPad 2 and I love it. Once I picked it up, it was hard to put down. 
Look how small it is? You wouldn’t believe that it has two cameras for FaceTime and 
HD video recording. It has 10 hour battery life and is super fast. You can go online, 
check email, read books so easily. Anyway, I have to go, but you should really think 
about getting one…” 
 
A.   Please rate the extent to which you felt each of the following while reading the above 
dialogue: 
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1 2 3 4 5 
Not felt at all    Strongly felt 
 
  Inspired 
   Excited 
   Resentment 
   Pleased 
  Jealous 
  Motivated 
  Frustrated 
 
Consumer Ratings Study 
The Consumer Ratings Study is investigating consumers’ bidding for products in 
different contexts (e.g., the type of reserve prices consumers set in online 
auctions, such as eBay). A product will be presented and you will be asked to 
indicate your willingness to pay for the product. Thank you! 
 
High status object condition: 
 
(1)  A watch made by a luxury watchmaker founded in Geneva in 1839. The watch is 
exclusive and warn by a very select group of people. 
 
What is the maximum percentage of the retail price that you would be willing to pay for this 
watch? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
10% 50% 100% 120% 
 
No status object condition: 
 
(1)  A watch made by a large American manufacturer. The watch is common and worn by 
many people. 
What is the maximum percentage of the retail price that you would be willing to pay for this 
watch? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
10% 50% 100% 120% 
 
Both conditions: 
 
To what extent do you think having the watch would make you feel happy? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
happy 
Extremely 
happy 
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